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Abstract 
Many low skilled jobs have been substituted away for machines in Europe, or eliminated, much more 
so than in the US, while technological progress at the “top”, i.e. at the high-tech sector, is faster in the 
US than in Europe. This paper suggests that the main difference between Europe and the US in this 
respect is their different labor market policies. European countries reduce wage flexibility and 
inequality through a host of labor market regulations, like binding minimum wage laws, permanent 
unemployment subsidies, firing costs, etc. Such policies create incentives to develop and adopt labor 
saving capital intensive technologies at the low end of the skill distribution.  At the same time 
technical change in the US is more skill biased than in Europe, since American skilled wages are 
higher. In the last few years some partial labor market reforms in Europe may have started to slow 
down or even reverse this trend. 
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1. Introduction 
It is close to impossible to find a parking attendant in Paris, Frankfurt or Milan, while in New York 
City they are common. When you arrive even in an average Hotel in an American city you are 
received by a platoon of bag carriers, door openers etc. In a similar hotel in Europe you often have to 
carry your bags on your own. These are not simply trivial traveler’s pointers, but indicate a deeper and 
widespread phenomenon: low skilled jobs have been substituted away for machines in Europe, or 
eliminated, much more than in the US, while technological progress at the “top” i.e. at the high-tech 
sector, is faster in the US than in Europe.1 Why? 
This paper suggests that an important difference between Europe and the US that leads to such 
technological differences lies is their different labor market policies. While US labor markets have 
been deregulated and labor unions there were significantly weakened, most European countries have 
kept wage inequality low through a host of labor market regulations, like binding minimum wage 
laws, permanent unemployment subsidies, firing costs, etc.2 These policies created incentives to 
develop and adopt labor saving capital-intensive technologies at the low end of the skill distribution. 
At the same time technical progress in the US has been more skill biased than in Europe, since 
American skilled wages have been higher. 
 There are only a few ways to model differential technology adoption across countries. One is to 
assume that technology adoption is costly, like Parente and Prescott (1995). This approach may help in 
understanding gaps between rich and poor countries, but it does not fit our case, since if adoption costs 
in Europe were higher, we should observe less technical progress in all sectors, which is not the case. 
Basu and Weil (1998) suggest instead that technology adoption depends on supplies of factors of 
                                                 
1 Acemoglu (2003a) supplies interesting empirical support to this observation of differential technological levels, as 
discussed below. 
2 In the last few years there have been some reforms of labor markets in several European countries. How these will unfold 
remains to be seen, but job creation in Europe has immediately picked up in response to those changes.  More on this 
below. See also Alesina and Giavazzi (2007) for discussion. 
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productions, as different technologies fit better different capital-labor ratios. But this approach as well 
is more applicable to the rich and poor countries, which differ significantly in their capital abundance, 
but cannot be applied to study differences between Europe and the US. We therefore resort to a third 
approach, following Champernowne (1963) and Zeira (1998, 2007), which models technological 
change as substituting labor by machines.3 According to this approach new technologies reduce labor 
costs but require purchasing machines, namely increasing capital costs.4 Hence, such technological 
innovations are invented and adopted only if wages are sufficiently high, so they reduce the cost of 
production.5 
 In this paper we apply this approach to a model of two sectors, skilled and unskilled, and we 
show that the wage in each sector determines the degree of technology in that sector. The model 
allows the two places, which we identify as “the US” and as “Continental Western Europe” (Europe in 
short), to differ in their supplies of skilled and unskilled workers and in their labor market policies. 
Greater labor regulation in Europe, in the form of unemployment benefits, and/or minimum wage laws 
and/or firing costs leads to reduction in the skill premium in Europe, and as a result to less skill-biased 
technical change, but also to more technical progress in the unskilled sector. We also calculate the 
welfare gains and losses from labor regulation, losses due to reduced output and gains due to social 
insurance. 
                                                 
3 Note that although the new technologies substitute labor by capital, the two factors of production are still highly 
complementary. Producing some tasks by machines instead of labor enables workers in the remaining tasks to be more 
productive. For example, an accountant who uses a computer for calculations she did manually in the past becomes more 
productive as a result. 
4 In most models a new technology enables production of the same amount with less of both inputs.   
5 The idea that a high cost of labor may lead to labor saving technologies is mentioned in other recent studies. Blanchard 
(1997) mentions substitution of labor by capital as one explanation for high European unemployment. Caballero and 
Hammur (1998) use a similar idea but do not apply it to low versus high skilled. Beaudry and Collard (2001) investigate 
convergence across industrial economies.  Saint Paul (2006) studies the effect of technology on factor distribution. 
Acemoglu (2003) is discussed in detail below. 
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 Many economists have attributed the large rise in the skill premium in the US to skill biased 
technical change.6 This paper suggests that both the rise of wage inequality and the skill biased 
technical change could have been to some extent a result of a third development, namely a 
deregulation in labor markets in the US. It therefore raises the hypothesis of some reverse causality, 
where the rise of wage inequality in the US induced skill biased technical change.  At the very least the 
technological revolutions in the US would have been seriously impeded if the labor market 
environment would have been more like in Europe, namely with stronger unions and more regulation. 
The paper also suggests that these opposite policies in Europe led to wage compression and as a result 
to less skill biased technical change and more technical change in low skilled sectors. 
 Much recent research has examined the effect of the different labor market policies in the US 
and in Europe on the divergence between the two areas in their economic performance after the 1970s. 
Higher unemployment in Europe relative to the US was attributed by many economists to these 
different labor market policies.7 Unemployment has been just part of the story. The number of work 
hours per person has declined steadily in Europe (especially in France, Germany and Italy) since the 
mid 1970s relative to the US.8  
The closest paper to ours is Acemoglu (2003a), that in a nice way lays the empirical basis for 
our analysis. Acemoglu shows that the differences in the skill premium between the US and Europe 
cannot be fully accounted to by the differences in labor supplies of skilled and unskilled in the two 
regions and not by the differences in labor market policies as well. He therefore concludes that there 
                                                 
6 See Davis and Haltwinger (1991), Katz and Murphy (1992), Bound and Johnson (1992), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 
(1993), Berman, Bound and Grilliches (1994), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Acemoglu (1998, 2003), and Berman, 
Bound and Machin (1998). 
7 See Blau and Kahn (1996, 2002), Freeman and Katz (1995), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and recently Ljungqvist and 
Sargent (2006) among many who point at labor regulation and especially firing costs as the major explanation of recent 
European unemployment. 
8 This decline has been in part lower participation in the labor force, in part longer vacations, and in part shorter work 
weeks.  See Prescott (2004) Blanchard (2004),  Alesina Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) and Rogerson (2007) for work on 
this point. More on this below. 
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must be differences in technology adoption between Europe and the US that affect the demands for the 
two types of workers. Acemoglu then raises a hypothesis similar to us, that the different labor market 
policies have led to differences in technology adoption, but the theoretical mechanism he offers is very 
different than ours, as described in Section 4 below. Our paper can therefore be viewed as continuing 
Acemoglu (2003a) by supplying a general theory of technology adoption that accounts for the 
differences between the two areas and also by supplying some empirical support to this theory. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and derives the basic 
results of the paper. Section 3 presents some aspects of the equilibrium and contains a welfare analysis 
of the model. Section 4 discusses the model, compares it to the literature and discusses extensions to 
other types of labor market regulations. Section 5 discusses some empirical implications of the model. 
The last section concludes and the appendix contains mathematical derivations of some results. 
 
2. A Model of Technology and Labor Regulation 
2.1 The Set-Up 
Consider a discrete time economy with overlapping generations. Each individual is born to a single 
parent, lives two periods and has a single offspring. Hence, population is fixed over time and we 
assume that each generation consists of a continuum of size 1. Individuals supply one unit of labor in 
first period of life and they can work as skilled if educated, or as unskilled if they are not. To an 
individual born to an educated parent learning is costless, but if born to an uneducated parent learning 
is infinitely costly. As a result the groups of skilled and unskilled are fixed over time.9 Also assume 
that educated people can work as unskilled, while people without education cannot work as skilled.10 
Denote by Ln the share of unskilled and by Ls be the share of skilled, so that: Ln+Ls = 1. In addition to 
                                                 
9 This assumption can be relaxed to get mobility between skilled and unskilled. The main results of the model are not 
altered. 
10 This assumption only warrants that skilled wages are higher or equal than unskilled wages. 
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being skilled or unskilled each person has individual efficiency e, which is assumed to be random, 
distributed uniformly between zero and 1, and independent of whether the individual is skilled or 
unskilled. There is a single final good in the economy, used for consumption and for investment. 
People derive utility from consumption of this final good in the two periods of life where ρ > 0:11 
(1)  .
1
)log(
)log( ρ++
o
y
cc  
Note that the choice of an overlapping-generations assumption is not crucial for the main 
results of the paper, but is helpful.  The positive results could be derived in a model of infinitely lived 
individuals as well, but in that case we could not calculate the “ex-ante expected utility” because all 
individuals would have already known their efficiency level. Hence, it makes no sense in such a case 
to calculate the welfare gains of the insurance element in the labor market regulation. We could also 
present the analysis in a model of non-overlapping-generations, but in that case we would have only 
borrowers in our world, to invest in capital, and no lenders. 
The single final good is produced by two intermediate goods, the skilled good S and the 
unskilled good N, using the following production function: 
(2)  .1 αα −= NSY  
The skilled good is produced by infinite tasks, or infinite intermediate goods ]1,0[∈i  according to the 
following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(3)  .)(loglog
1
0
∫+= diisaS  
Each i can be produced by one of two potential technologies. One is manual, where a unit of i is 
produced by 1 efficiency unit of skilled labor. The second technology is industrial and it produces one 
unit of i by a machine of size or cost k(i). Capital, namely machines, depreciates fully within 1 period. 
                                                 
11 The log utility assumption matters only for the calculation of optimal welfare and is discussed below. 
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Development or adoption of a new technology, which is imbedded in a machine, is costless. Hence, 
the only cost of the industrial technology is the cost of the machine. It is assumed that this cost k(i) is 
rising with i.12 To solve the model analytically we use the following specification: 
(4)  .
1
1)(
i
ik −=  
The unskilled good is produced by a similar production function: 
(5)  .)(loglog
1
0
∫+= diinaN  
Each unskilled intermediate good is produced either by one efficiency unit of unskilled labor or by a 
machine of size k(i), where the function k is the same as in (4).13 
 The economy is open to capital mobility and small, so that the world interest rate is given and 
equal to r, and the gross interest rate is R = 1 + r. The economy trades only in the final good, and not 
in skilled, unskilled and intermediate goods.  
          Those without jobs are entitled to an unemployment compensation of v times the wage of 
unskilled, where v < 1, which is financed by a tax on income, at a fixed rate t. The tax is paid on the 
transfer payments as well and the government budget is balanced. 
2.2 Technology Adoption 
Denote by wn (ws) the gross wage rate per efficiency unit of an unskilled (skilled) worker. First, a 
skilled intermediate good is produced by machines, if:  
  .
1
)(
i
RiRkws −=≥  
                                                 
12 This is just an ordering assumption and has no effect on the analysis. 
13 We can assume that the sectors are not symmetric and that the cost of a machine that replaces a skilled worker is bs/(1-i), 
while the cost of a machine that replaces an unskilled workers is bn/(1-i). The qualitative results of the model remain the 
same. 
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Hence, all skilled intermediate goods sfi ≤  are produced by machines, where the technological 
frontier for skilled workers, fs, is determined by: 
(6)  .1
s
s w
Rf =−  
Similarly: 14 
(7)  .1
n
n w
Rf =−  
  Let PS be the price of the skilled good, and ps(i) be the price of the intermediate good i in the 
production of S. On the demand side we can use the first order conditions of profit maximization of 
producers of the final good, the skilled and the unskilled good. On the supply side prices of 
intermediate goods in the two sectors are equal to production cost, due to free entry and constant 
returns to scale. Hence: 
(8)  
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Prices of intermediate goods in the unskilled sector are similar. Equating demand and supply prices 
leads, as shown in the appendix, to the following equilibrium condition:  
(9)  ,log)1( Raff ns −+=−+ εαα  
where )1log()1(log ααααε −−+= . We call equation (9) the “goods markets equilibrium 
condition.” It describes a trade-off between the two technology frontiers. 
                                                 
14 Note that (6) and (7) require that wages are greater than R. If not f = 0 and there is no industrialization. We do not dwell 
on this case as it is clearly remote from the advanced economies we analyze. 
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 Denote the wage ratio between the skilled and unskilled by I, as it reflects the degree of wage 
inequality in the economy. From conditions (6) and (7) we get that this wage inequality is related to 
the technology frontiers in the two sectors: 
  .
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Hence, we get the “labor market constraint:” 
(10)  .1 sn IfIf +−=  
Together, the equations (9) and (10) determine the equilibrium values of technologies adopted 
and the wages in each sector given the wage ratio I, as shown in Figure 1.. The G curve describes the 
goods market equilibrium condition (9), while the L curve describes the labor market constraint (10). 
Since skilled workers can always switch and work as unskilled the wage ratio I satisfies: ∞<≤ I1 . 
 
 
fs 
fn 
(I-1)/I 
(a+ε-logR)/α 
G 
L 
Figure 1: Determination of Technology Frontiers 
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A calculation of the equilibrium in Figure 1 yields the two technology frontiers: 
(11)  ,
)1(
log11
I
aRfs αα
ε
−+
−−+−=  
and: 
(12)  .
)1(
log11
I
aRIfn αα
ε
−+
−−+−=  
A sufficient condition for no corner solution at any wage inequality I between 1 and infinity is 
that the basic productivity parameter a should satisfy: 
 (13)  .log1log εεα −+≤≤−+ RaR  
  As wage inequality I increases, the curve L shifts down, reducing fn and increasing fs. . Hence 
wage inequality induces technical adoption of machines in the skilled sector but reduces it in the 
unskilled sector. As a result, the wage of skilled workers rises and the wage of unskilled workers 
declines. A change in productivity a. instead shifts the curve G. Hence, a country with higher 
productivity adopts more machines in both sectors, skilled and unskilled. 
 As shown above reducing wage inequality raises the wage of unskilled, but also lowers the 
wage of skilled. The reason is the complementarity between the skilled and unskilled goods in the 
production of final goods (2). Raising wages of unskilled reduces their input and thus reduces the 
unskilled good. This lowers the marginal productivity of the skilled good, its price and the skilled 
wage as well. Thus, many policies that raise the unskilled wage in order to reduce wage inequality end 
up in lowering the wages of the skilled as well. 
2.3. Equilibrium Wage Inequality 
A worker chooses to work only if her earnings exceed the welfare payment. Hence an unskilled works 
only if: )1()1( tvwtew nn −≥− , namely if e ≥ v. The unskilled rate of unemployment is 
(14)  .vun =  
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A skilled supplies labor if: ).1()1( tvwtew ns −≥−  Hence: 
(15)  .
I
vus =  
Note that this is voluntary unemployment. Involuntary unemployment is described below when we 
discuss minimum wages and firing costs. 
We next derive the wage ratio I from the labor market equilibrium conditions for skilled and 
unskilled. The appendix shows how these conditions are derived from equating supplies and demands 
for labor in terms of efficiency units of skilled labor: 
(16)  ,1
2 22
2
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 −  
and of unskilled labor: 
(17)  ( ) .)1(1
2 2
2
n
n
w
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From these two conditions we derive the equilibrium value of wage inequality I: 
(18)  .)1(
1
222 vv
L
LI
s
n +−−= α
α  
Note that 1)]1(/[ ≥−αα sn LL . Otherwise the wage ratio is lower than 1 and as a result skilled workers 
turn to unskilled jobs, which pay a higher wage. That drives wage inequality up to 1, by reducing the 
actual Ls, which restores the above condition. This condition implies both that wage inequality is 
greater or equal to 1, and that it depends negatively on the degree of labor market regulation v. 
2.4. The Effect of Unemployment Compensation 
 A country with a larger unemployment compensation v has a lower wage inequality I.  As a result this 
country adopts less machines in the skilled sector, namely fs is lower, but has more machines in the 
unskilled sector, namely fn is higher. In such a country ws is lower and wn is higher. The effect of labor 
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regulation on wage inequality works through the effective supplies of skilled and unskilled labor since 
unemployment compensation reduces the supply of unskilled by more than the supply of skilled.  
 
3. Equilibrium and Welfare 
In this section we complete the description of equilibrium, more specifically we calculate the amounts 
of capital in the various sectors, aggregate output, output in each sector, and the tax rate. We also try in 
this section to examine why countries differ in their labor regulation, namely in v. 
3.1. Capital across Sectors 
Once the two technology frontiers are determined we can calculate the amounts of capital in the 
various sectors and in the two aggregate sectors. Capital in the skilled sector is: 
(19)  .
1
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Capital in the unskilled sector is: 
(20)  .)1(
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If wage inequality declines, due to greater unemployment compensation, capital in the skilled 
sector Ks is reduced relative to output, while Kn increases relative to output. These are empirical 
implications that are explored in Section 5. Note also that the positive relationship between wage 
inequality and the relative capital in the skilled sector is observationally equivalent to capital-skill 
complementarity. 
3.2. Output and the Government Budget 
 The aggregate unemployment rate is: 
  .111 

 

 −−=+=
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I
vLvLu ssn  
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Agregate output is calculated from the labor market equilibrium (16) and is equal to: 
(21)  .1
2
2
2
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
 −= α  
An increase in v reduces I and reduces ws. Hence, labor market regulation v reduces output and 
increases unemployment. Note that a balanced budget requires: 
(22)  ( ) ./)( nsnnssnn vwIvLvLvwuLuLtY +=+=  
If v is higher both the unemployment rate is higher and the compensation per unemployed is higher, so 
that the overall amount of compensation, namely the right hand side of (22), is higher. Since output or 
income is lower, the tax rate must be higher. 
3.3. The Output of Sectors 
Knowing the level of aggregate output enables us to calculate the levels of output and of output per 
worker (labor productivity) in each sector, skilled and unskilled. The output of the skilled sector in 
terms of the numeraire, which is the final good, is equal to: 
  .1
2 2
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Since the number of workers in the sector is )/1( IvLs −  we get by using (6) that labor productivity in 
the skilled sector is equal to: 
(23)  ( ) .1)1(2/1 2 

 +−=− I
v
f
R
IvL
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ss
S  
  Note that the effect of labor regulation on labor productivity in the skilled sector is mixed. 
There is a positive effect through Iv /1+ , which reflects higher average efficiency of workers. There 
is an opposite negative effect through 2)1( −− sf , which reflects less skilled technologies. Similarly the 
labor productivity in the unskilled sector can be calculated to be: 
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(24)  ( ) ( ).1)1(21 2 vf
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Here the effect of labor regulation is clear cut. It increases labor productivity in the unskilled sector 
both by raising the average efficiency of workers and also by increasing unskilled-biased technology 
frontier fn. 
   
3.4. Welfare Considerations 
Consider the ex-ante expected utility of each person at birth, before her efficiency is known, as the 
correct measure of welfare. This is actually the average utility of skilled and of unskilled in each 
generation. In the appendix we show that ex-post utility is a linear transformation of the logarithm of 
net income. We therefore use log income as a measure of indirect utility. As shown in the appendix 
expected utility of unskilled is: 
(25)  ,1)1log(log −−++= tvwU nn  
and expected utility of skilled is:  
(26)  .1)1log(log −−++= t
I
vwU ss  
The effect of increasing v is therefore mixed. On the one hand it has a direct positive effect on welfare, 
due to reducing the probability of poverty and low income. On the other hand it raises tax payments. 
Also, increasing welfare raises the unskilled wage, but lowers skilled wage. Hence it has different 
effects on the two types of workers. 
 The average welfare within a generation is a reasonable measure for ex-ante welfare, since the 
government does not transfer income across generations. Average ex-ante expected welfare, with 
equal weights to all, is equal to: 
(27)  .)1()(AVG ssnsssnn ULULULULU +−=+=  
 16
We focus on this variable in order to find which level of labor regulation v maximizes average welfare. 
We then examine whether the difference in labor regulation between Europe and the US can be 
explained by our model. Since the two countries differ in Ls, they might differ also in their optimal v. 
Can that explain the observed difference in labor regulation and the resulting difference in wage 
inequality between the two regions? 
 The calculation of average utility is quite complicated and we resort to simulations. For that, 
we must specify reasonable values for the four parameters of the model: productivity a, the gross 
interest rate R, the share of skilled goods in the production of the final good α, which is also the 
elasticity of the final good with respect to skilled goods, and share of skilled workers in the population 
Ls.  
Our choice of parameters is guided by our interest in comparing the US and Europe. Assuming 
that they are similar in interest rates and production parameters, our exercise centers on comparing 
outcomes across different values of Ls, keeping the other parameters fixed. For values of Ls we choose 
the percentage of the population between ages 15 and 64 that had completed tertiary education in 
1995. Thus for the US Ls = 0.33, and for Europe Ls = 0.17, where “Europe” is taken to be the average 
of France, Germany, and Italy.15 R =2 is a realistic interest rate for a period of one generation. To set α 
note that the ratio of wages of college graduates and of high school graduates in the US has been 1.9 in 
the late 1990s, as shown by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005). We then apply this figure to equation 
(18) and find that if v is somewhere between 0 and .5 (which is a reasonable range for the US, as it has 
high participation rate in the labor force) α is between .64 and .69. We therefore set α = 2/3 as an 
intermediate value. Finally, the productivity parameter a is set to satisfy condition (13) for an interior 
solution: 1.99 ≤ a ≤ 2.33. We therefore set a = log(8) ~  2.08. 
                                                 
15 See Barro and Lee (2001). 
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Figure 2: Optimal Unemployment Compensation 
 
Figure 2 shows how the level of v that maximizes AVG (U), changes with the amount of skill. 
Figure 2 is drawn for Ls ≤ 2/3, as implied by the constraint 1)1/( ≥− sn LL αα , which is required by I ≥ 
1. Figure 2 is drawn both for the logarithmic utility function used in the benchmark model, with 
relative risk aversion of 1, but also for a much lower level of risk aversion of .5. Figure 2 shows that 
optimal v is positive, namely labor market regulation increases welfare by supplying insurance against 
being born with low efficiency.16 Figure 2 also shows that optimal v does not change much with skill, 
since it is concave. Optimal v fluctuates between 0.4 and 0.61. Figure 2 also shows that optimal v does 
not depend much on the degree of risk aversion. 
 The locations of US and Europe on the curve in Figure 2 point at their optimal unemployment 
compensation. We can use equation (18) to calculate their implied v, namely the unemployment 
                                                 
16 We can also consider a Pareto-dominating policy, of means tested transfer payment. But such a policy fails if efficiency 
is not observed when the worker does not work. Then workers with low efficiency prefer to avoid work altogether. Under 
such moral hazard the policy in the model is indeed optimal. 
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compensation which yields the observed wage inequality in the country, according to the model. The 
optimal v for the US should be .58. Its implied v, for a wage ratio of 1.9, is .383. The optimal v for 
Europe should be .61. Since the wage ratio in Europe is 1.4 according to Brunello, Comi, and Lucifora 
(2000), its implied v is .943.17 This simple exercise implies that unemployment compensation in the 
US is significantly below the optimal while in Europe it is significantly above the optimal. This means 
that our model cannot explain the differences in labor regulation, or social policies, between the US 
and Europe. In other words, the different supplies of skill are not the only source of difference between 
Europe and the US. There are also other explanations, including different degrees of aversion to 
inequality and different perception of the benefits of social insurance versus market distortions.18 
 
4. Discussion and extensions 
4. 1. Other Forms of Labor Regulation 
Unemployment compensation is not the only form of labor market regulation.  Amongst the most 
common other regulations are binding minimum wage floors, and various costs and legal prohibitions 
of firing workers.  In our model these policies yield qualitatively the same results as unemployment 
compensation, namely they reduce wage inequality, raise unskilled wages, lower skilled wage and thus 
bias technology toward the unskilled sector. 
 To study the effect of minimum wages we apply this policy to our basic model from Section 2. 
Only one assumption needs to be changed, which is the assumption that worker’s efficiency is known 
to all. Under this assumption all workers with efficiency below the minimum wage are fired. It means 
that the minimum wage policy hurts all and thus no one should want it. We assume instead that 
worker’s efficiency is unknown but can be observed by employers for only some of the workers. 
                                                 
17 This is of course a very high and unrealistic figure, but it points to the conclusion that intervention in Europe is very high 
relative to the US. 
18 See  Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for more discussion of this point. 
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Hence only part of the workers who have low efficiency are fired. The appendix shows that in this 
model a minimum wage regulation reduces wage inequality, since it applies mostly to the unskilled. 
Therefore the minimum wage regulation induces unskilled bias technology and reduces skill-bias 
technologies. 
 The appendix also contains an analysis of the effect of firing costs on wages and technology. It 
shows that firing costs have a similar effect to that of unemployment benefits or minimum wages. The 
intuitive reason is that prices of intermediate goods reflect also firing costs and these are relatively 
larger for unskilled. Thus firing costs reduce the ratio of prices (and wages) between the two sectors. 
Note that both under minimum wages and under firing costs some workers become involuntarily 
unemployed. Hence, such policies should usually be accompanied with some welfare payments, or 
unemployment benefits. In these cases it does not affect the equilibrium if the amount of 
unemployment benefits is lower than the minimum wage. 
All these labor regulations reduce wage inequality. This is also often a direct objective of labor 
unions and of governments, especially in Europe.19 Such policies yield similar results to those 
described above, since setting a bound on wage inequality is equivalent to minimum wages. Another 
way to understand this issue is to consider a union that acts as a labor monopoly and sets higher 
unskilled wages. All these deviations from competitive wage inequality lead to unskilled biased 
technology. 
4.2. Induced Innovations or Directed Technical Change 
At this point we would like to compare our approach and results to an alternative literature, which also 
relates technical progress to supplies and prices of factors of production. This literature was originally 
called ‘induced innovations’, and was pioneered by Kennedy (1964), Samuelson (1965), Nelson and 
                                                 
19 For a discussion of Europeans’ aversion to inequality and unions’ policoes to limit wage inequality see Alesina and 
Glaeser (2004), Alesina, Di Tella and Mc Culloch (2004), Blau and Khan (2002) and also Kramarz (2007). 
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Phelps (1966) and others, who were the first to treat innovation as endogenous. A recent extension of 
this literature, which connects it to the scale effect from the endogenous growth literature, is called 
‘directed technical change,’ and has been developed mainly by Acemoglu, in Acemoglu (1998), 
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Acemoglu (2003b) and other papers. 
When applied to our topic of skilled vs. unskilled labor, this literature can be described by use 
of the following production function: 
  ].,[ nnss LALAFY =  
As and An are productivities of skilled and unskilled labor respectively. Technical change increases 
these productivities. This production function implies that technical progress for skilled labor is more 
profitable and thus higher, if this factor is relatively more abundant and if its price is lower. Hence, the 
skill-bias of technical change is inversely related to the skill premium.20 This prediction is opposite to 
that of our paper, as mentioned already in Acemoglu (2003a). Thus our model and the induced 
innovation literature have conflicting predictions on the relationship between relative wages and 
technical change. This shows that while the Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) is doing a great job in 
explaining differences between the North and the South, a different model is required for 
understanding the differences between Europe and the US. 
 The intuitive explanation for the difference between the two approaches lies in the different 
modeling of the relationship between labor and capital. In our model technical change both replaces 
skill, in intermediates [0, f], and complements it, in intermediates (f, 1], while in the directed technical 
change model capital only complements skill. This is why the two approaches have opposite 
predictions on technical progress and wages.  
                                                 
20 This inverse relationship is mitigated by technical change itself that increases the skill premium. But when two countries 
are compared, as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), this inverse relationship remains and technical change is skill-biased in 
the country that has a lower skill premium. This result holds even when the Acemoglu and Zilibotti analysis is applied with 
some necessary changes to the US and Europe instead of the North and South. 
 21
4.3. Standard Factors’ Substitution 
A potential criticism on our model could be that empirically it is not different from the standard 
neoclassical model of substitution between labor and capital. Even if technology is fixed, changes in 
labor regulation could lead to substitution of labor by capital in the skilled and unskilled sectors. But 
such an approach misses two important points. One is of course that it does not discuss difference in 
technology across countries, while according to our model not only capital replaces labor, but the 
production function changes with it. The second point is that the neoclassical model with fixed 
technology has already failed empirically in trying to explain the differences between Europe and the 
US. This is the main point in the Acemoglu (2003a), where he shows that the differences in skill 
premia in Europe and the US cannot be fully explained by the differences in labor supplies and in 
various regulations, and there must be difference in technology as well. Our own analysis supplies 
additional support to this result. 
4. 4. Acemoglu (2003a) Residual Rent Explanation 
As already mentioned in the introduction, at the end of his paper Acemoglu (2003a) raises a similar 
hypothesis to ours, namely that labor regulation in Europe biased technology toward less-skilled. The 
explanation he offers is quite different than ours and is based mainly on the assumption that employers 
and workers share rents in their wage-setting. Hence, a technological innovation usually increases the 
rent and leads to higher wages and to higher profits as well. But if wages are not negotiated and 
instead are set by some labor regulation, like minimum wages, the residual rent from an innovation is 
not shared between the employer and the workers, but goes completely to the employer. Since such 
minimum wages apply mainly to unskilled labor, that makes the employer more willing to adopt 
innovations that increase productivity of unskilled workers. We offer a very different explanation, 
which is based on a general theory of technology adoption. It applies to competitive wage setting and 
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to all types of labor market regulations. We also supply some preliminary empirical support to our 
theory. 
 
5. Some Empirical Evidence 
In this section we review some empirical evidence that supports the implications of our model. Part of 
it is gathered from works by others and part is added by us. The evidence is drawn mostly from 
comparisons between the US and Continental Western Europe (Europe in short). 
5.1. Labor Market Regulation and Wage Compression 
Up to the mid-seventies unemployment was lower in Europe than in the US and Europeans were 
working longer hours. After that everything changed: unemployment increased and remained much 
higher in Europe than in the US and hours worked per person fell in Europe while they remained 
roughly constant in the US.  What happened?  The supply shocks of the seventies were accompanied 
by wage moderation in the US, while in Europe strong unions imposed real wage growth. At the same 
time European governments continued with the policies that began in the late sixties, of introducing 
and then reinforcing a host of labor market regulations such as binding minimum wage laws, firing 
costs and unemployment subsidies often unrelated to job search.21 As convincingly shown by 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), the interaction of this kind of labor institutions and those 
macroeconomic shocks generated persistent unemployment.22 Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) 
also discuss how union policies led to reduction of working hours for those who remained at work.23 
                                                 
21 See Lazear (1990) and the detailed study of French labor institutions by Blanchard, Cohen and Nuveau (2005).  
22 Subsequent work by Bertola Blau and Kahn (2002) confirms these results.  
23 Alesina Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) calculate that about one third of difference in work hours per person between 
France and Germany on one side and the US on the other is due to higher participation in the labor force in the US. 
Comparing US and Italy the same factors (labor force participation) explain more than half of the difference in work hours. 
Additional factors explaining lower work hours are marginal tax rates (Prescott (2004)) and preferences for leisure 
(Blanchard (2004)).  
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Rogerson (2007) offers two additional explanations to the reduction of working hours, one is higher 
taxation and the other is difference in technology, as Europe specializes much less in services than the 
US. These explanations fit nicely within our approach, since we claim that different regulation and 
taxation also lead to differences in technology adoption. In another related paper Rogerson and 
Wallenius (2007) find that the differences in employment between the US and Europe are mainly for 
the young and older workers. This finding also fits our framework where the workers with lowest 
efficiency are not working due to various labor regulations.24 
          In the eighties and the nineties Europe and the US diverged also in their wage gaps between 
skilled and unskilled.25  As Blau and Khan (1996, 2002) document the ratio of wages in the 50-10 
deciles increased in those years in the US by 13 per cent for men and by 18.6 per cent for women. In 
Europe it increased only by 4 and 3 per cent respectively. In their study Blau and Kahn (2002) 
conclude, after controlling for many other factors, that union policies and labor market regulations 
were crucial in explaining the difference in wage dispersion on the two sides of the Atlantic.26 
5.2. Differences in Capital Intensity 
In this sub-section we present some observations that support our claim that there are difference in 
technology between the US and Europe along the skill line, and that these differences are reflected in 
differences in capital intensities. 
5.2.1. Capital Labor Ratios 
Blanchard (1997) notes that after the shocks of the seventies European firms shifted to labor saving 
technologies, which increased the capital labor ratio and after a period of adjustment, also raised 
profits. From 1980 to the late nineties capital-labor ratios have been increasing steadily and sharply in 
Continental Europe, while they have been quite stable in Anglo-Saxon economies, as shown in Figure 
                                                 
24 See also Glyn (2007) for an empirical discussion 
25 See Katz and Murphy (1992) for early work on relative supply of skilled versus unskilled labor. 
26 See also Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) for a discussion of wage dispersion in OECD countries. 
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3.  Caballero and Hammur (1998) report a positive correlation between the capital labor ratio and the 
degree of labor protection in OECD countries. 
This evidence does not distinguish between low killed and high skilled sectors. To do that we 
turn to the European Union report edited by O’Mahoney and van Ark (2003). This report, which 
compares productivity between Europe and the US, uses data from the OECD and from work done in 
the Groningen Growth and Development Center. The study shows indeed that productivity and capital 
intensity vary by sector across the two regions. This study compares the levels of capital per hour 
worked at 2000, relative to total economy ratios, between the US and four European countries: France, 
Germany, Netherlands, and UK. The report divides sectors to four levels of skill: high, high 
intermediate, low intermediate and low. Taking only the high and low skill sectors and avoiding the 
public sectors we summarize the comparison in Figure 4.27 Clearly all high-skill sectors in the US use 
relatively more capital per labor than in Europe. Also, most low-skill sectors in Europe use more 
capital per labor than in the US, except for Agriculture and mining. Note that these two sectors are also 
geography dependent. Since the US is land abundant relative to the major European countries this can 
explain the high capital to labor ratio in these sectors. In general, these results support the main claim 
of our theory. 
5.2.1. Capital Output Ratios 
Another variable that should be examined with respect to our theory is the capital output ratio in 
skilled and in unskilled sectors. Remember that from equations (19) and (20) we get that this ratio in 
the skilled sector is 
  .
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and in the unskilled sector it is 
                                                 
27 This figure is based on Tables II.6 and II.9a in O’Mahoney and van Ark (2003). 
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Hence, comparing capital output ratios across countries enables to compare the degrees of skill-biased 
and unskilled-biased technologies. A word of caution applies. Capital usually includes not only 
machines and equipment, which are the focus of our model, but also structures, which could differ 
across countries due to many reasons, like land abundance. 
With this in mind we have assembled data on capital in the skilled and unskilled sectors in the 
US and in Europe with special emphasis on the three largest Continental European countries: 
Germany, France and Italy. The data for the European countries are from the OECD, while the data for 
the US is from the BEA, as the OECD Stan data do not contain capital amounts for the US.28 We 
divided (in a rough manner) sectors between skilled and unskilled according to the share of skilled 
professions, where a sector with more than 50% skilled is defined as skilled.29 We then sum up net 
capital stocks in both types of sectors to get Ks and Kn. 
Figure 5 presents the ratios of capital to output in the skilled sectors in our four countries: US, 
France, Germany, and Italy. It shows that the level of technology in these sectors was higher in the US 
than in the European countries, except for Germany. Figure 6 shows the ratios of capital to output in 
the unskilled sectors and it clearly shows that unskilled biased technology in the US is below the 
European countries in recent decades. Furthermore, the two figures show that while skill-biased 
technology increased in the US in recent decades, unskilled-biased technology declined significantly at 
the same time. 
Dividing all sectors to low and high skilled may be problematic, due to the many intermediate 
sectors, so it may be useful to look at more specific sectors, mainly at those where the definition is 
                                                 
28 The two data sets differ in their sector qualification, as the BEA data follow NICS while the OECD data follow SICS. 
We have matched the two data sets together. 
29 The classification of sectors to skilled and unskilled is done by BLS data for 1989 and 1990.  
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more likely to be accurate. When dealing with specific sectors, which are relatively small we look at 
the ratio of capital to value added at the sector rather than country output Y, to control for differences 
in relative size of sector. Note that from equations (19) and (20) we get that the ratios of capital to 
value added in the two sectors are RfSPK sSs // =  and RfNPK nNn // = . Hence, these ratios 
provide good signals to the state of technology in a sector. 
We focus first on two sectors, which are very low skilled, according to all sources: textile and 
other community, social and personal services.30 Figure 7 shows that the ratio of capital to value added 
in these sectors is higher in continental Europe than in the US.  The same results would apply if we 
focus only on the three largest economies France, Germany and Italy. On the other end of the skill 
ladder are the computer sector and the education sector, which are clearly high skilled. They indeed 
have higher capital to value added ratio in the US relative to continental Europe, as displayed in Figure 
8.31 The two biggest sectors that are more intermediate but are still classified by O’Mahoney and Van 
Ark (2003) as LIS (less intermediate skilled), are construction and the retail and wholesale sectors 
(where retail has slightly lower skills then wholesale). Figure 9 shows that the capital to value added 
ratio in these sectors are higher in Europe than in the US. Glyn et al. (2007) examine in detail the 
service sectors in the US and in Europe and show that the capital labor ratio in retail relative to the 
capital labor ratio in manifactirung was 0.34 in the US, 0.43 in France and 0.56 in Germany. Thus, the 
low skilled retail sector is relatively more capital intensive in france and germany than in the US.32 
The same authors state that “in the US…in retail the least skilled are overrepresented while in France 
and Germany they are underrepresented.” They also find that in the eighties and nineties these 
divergent trends have been especially striking between France and the US. 
                                                 
30 See O’Mahoney and Van Ark (2003) for various sources to the skill taxonomy. 
31 We should caution that since most education is public it might not always react to market prices. Figure 7 implies that it 
does with respect to input prices.  
32 See table 6 of Glyn et al (2007).  
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5.3 Innovations 
We next look at some direct evidence on technology adoption. Comin and Hobijn’s (2004) data set 
contains information on adoption of some technologies by 24 countries over the last 215 years. We 
compare US to France, Germany and Italy, the three largest Continental European countries.  For most 
of the technologies in the data set it is unclear whether they are low skill or high skill labor saving, but 
for two cases we feel pretty confident. Figures 10 and 11 show the patterns of adoption of personal 
computers and of industrial robots in these countries. One could safely argue that computers substitute 
(and complement) high skill labor while robots substitute for low skill labor. The figures show that 
there are significantly more PCs per capita in the US than in the three European countries while there 
are significantly more robots per capita in the three European countries.  
Finally, additional evidence consistent with our theory is presented in Lewis (2005). Using 
plant level data, he shows that the degree of adoption of automation technologies (thus of capital 
intensity) is higher in US cities that have received less immigration of low skill workers. He even 
uncovers de-adoption of automation technologies in cities that receive an especially large influx of 
low-skill immigrants.  
5.4. Job Creation  
One implication of our argument is that the ratio of high skilled jobs created in Europe relative to low 
skilled jobs should be higher than in the US. Pissarides (2006) indeed finds that until very recently job 
creation in Europe was sluggish in the low-skilled service sectors, where most job creation has 
occurred in the US and UK.33 Pissarides (2006) concludes that European countries have been 
successful at creating jobs in the “knowledge sectors” …but unsuccessful at creating them in “labor 
                                                 
33 See also Rogerson (2007) for a discussion of the sluggish growth of the service sector in Europe versus the Us and its 
effects on hours worked. 
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intensive….sectors,” which is exactly one of the implications of our model.34 His paper also shows a 
strong negative correlation between the level of labor market regulations and job creation in low 
skilled community service jobs (Figure 6 of Pissarides (2006)).  
In recent years a few continental European countries such as France and especially Italy and 
Spain have introduced entry level temporary labor contracts outside of the tightly regulated primary 
market. The results have been immediate: job creation has jumped up, especially in Spain and Italy, 
for jobs using these types of contracts.  Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) document in detail how after the 
partial labor market reforms of the late nineties that introduced temporary contracts available to 
employers outside of the tightly regulated primary market, employment in these countries increased 
dramatically, despite a relative low GDP growth.  Europe went from jobless growth to job creation 
with low growth.  In table 1 of their paper Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) document how the rapid growth 
of employment since these labor reforms in six continental European countries was almost exclusively 
driven by temporary contracts and not in the primary labor market. Since the late nineties Spain 
created 3 million of these types of jobs, about 30 per cent of the labor force. Call centers and a variety 
of others low skilled occupations have started to appear very recently in Continental Europe as well. 
 
6. Conclusions 
After the seventies’ the performance of labor markets in Europe and in the US departed significantly in 
many aspects. In the US labor markets further deregulated and the US experienced a sharp increase in 
wage inequality, a stagnation of real wages for low skilled work, low unemployment and stability of 
hours worked per person. In Europe, on the contrary, labor regulation increased in the aftermath of the 
early seventies’ shocks. Unions’ policies targeted defending wages by imposing binding minimum 
                                                 
34 See Table 4 of Pissarides (2006) for evidence. 
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wage laws and similar regulations.  The result has been higher and persistent unemployment, lower 
hours worked per person and a much more equal wage distribution. 
This paper shows how these developments in relative wages also influenced technology 
adoption in the two places. Lower wage gaps in Europe have led firms to switch to labor saving 
technologies at the low end of the skill distribution. Hence, low skilled labor has been substituted 
away by machines in Europe more than in the US. Meanwhile, opposite development occurred at the 
US, where higher skilled wages encouraged skill biased technical change much more than in Europe. 
Obviously various exogenous developments in science and technology, like the invention of 
computers, have played an important role as well, but we claim that the speed of adoption and of 
adjustment to new technologies depends on labor market regulations and policies. 
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Appendix 
 
Derivation of the Goods Market Equilibrium Condition 
The first order condition for each intermediate good in the skilled sector is: 
(A1)  .
)()(
)(
is
SP
is
SPip SSs =∂
∂=  
Equating this demand price with the supply price in equation (8), deriving s(i) and then substituting in 
the production function of the skilled good (3) we get: 
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fffdiis −−−−=−∫ )1log()1()1log(0  we get that the price of the skilled good is equal 
to: 
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In a similar way it is shown that the price of the unskilled good is 
(A3)  .loglog aRfP nN −+=  
 While these prices reflect the supply side, from the demand side prices satisfy the following 
first order conditions: 
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Substituting these first order conditions into the production function (2) we get the following 
constraint on the prices of the two goods: 
(A4)  ,log)1(log εαα =−+ NS PP  
where ε denotes )1log()1(log αααα −−+ . Substitute (A2) and (A3) in (A4) and get: 
  .log)1( Raff ns −+=−+ εαα  
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This is the goods markets equilibrium condition. 
 
Derivation of the Labor Market Equilibrium Conditions 
The supply of employed skilled labor in efficiency units is equal according to (15) to: 
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The supply of unskilled labor is equal according to (14) to: 
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The demand for unskilled labor is equal to: 
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Equating the supplies and demands yields the equilibrium conditions (16) and (17). 
 
Derivation of Expected Utilities 
The ex-post utility of a person with net income j in first period of life is 
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Hence, utility is a linear transformation of log j. The expected log of income of a skilled worker before 
efficiency is realized is: 
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This proves equation (25). Ex-ante expected log income of skilled is calculated similarly. 
 
Analysis of the Effect of Minimum Wages 
Assume a similar model to the one in section 2, except for the following differences. First, all skilled 
workers have efficiency 1. Second, unskilled workers have the same distribution of efficiency as in the 
benchmark model, but a worker’s efficiency e is unknown both to the worker and to the employer. It 
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can be observed by the employer only if the worker is monitored and only a proportion m of workers is 
monitored. We also assume that unskilled firms are sufficiently large so that the distribution of 
workers’ efficiencies within each firm is the same as the aggregate distribution. Clearly, despite the 
different levels of efficiency unskilled workers are paid the same wage wn due to asymmetry in 
information. Finally, assume that there is minimum wage regulation that sets the wage of unskilled to 
be at some ratio with the skilled wage: 
(A.5)  .sn gww =  
To derive the equilibrium we look at an employer who uses unskilled labor to produce an intermediate 
good. The employer knows the efficiency of m of the workers and fires a worker with efficiency e 
if: .)( nn wiep <  Hence, the upper bound for firing unskilled workers is En(i), which is equal to:
 .)()( ipwiE nnn =  The unskilled workers who are left in production are therefore those who 
have higher efficiency or those who have not been monitored. 
Next consider technology adoption. In the skilled sector technology depends on comparing the cost of 
machine production to the cost of a worker, which is also the cost of one efficiency unit. Hence, the 
technological threshold in the skilled sector is: 
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In the unskilled sector a producer shifts to the industrial technology if the unit cost of producing by 
machines is lower than the average unit cost of producing by labor. Hence, the technology frontier at 
the unskilled sector is determined by: 
(A.7)  .
)(
1
)(
2
)1(
)1(
1
2
2
2
1
0
1
)(
1
0
1
)(
ip
wm
ip
wmw
edemedem
dewmdewm
f
R
n
n
n
n
n
iE
niE n
n
b
n
−
−
=
−+
−+
=− ∫∫
∫∫
 
To derive the equilibrium price of an unskilled intermediate good which is produced labor, note that 
profits are driven to zero by free entry. Hence price equals average cost and it follows from (A.7) that: 
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Solving (A.8) shows that the price is equal to: nnn xwpip ==)(  where x is: 
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Hence the technology frontier in the unskilled sector is described by: 
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Given that the ratio between the unskilled and skilled wages is g due to wage compression, we get: 
(A10)  ).1(1 ns fgxf −−=  
An increase in g reduces fs and ws and raises fn and wn. Hence, the effect of labor force regulation on 
technical change is the same as in the benchmark model. Note that without minimum wage regulation 
the free market equilibrium wage ratio, Ie is given by: 
  .11 22
e
s
n Ix
L
x
mL α
α−=

 −  
If g is higher than the equilibrium wage ratio, which is the case if it is effective, there are two types of 
unemployment of unskilled. There are xmmEn =  fired workers, and there are also workers who are 
not hired at all, since the unskilled wage rate is too high. 
 
Analysis of the Effect of Firing Costs 
Assume that the model is similar to the benchmark model except for one difference. Individual 
efficiency e is unknown to the worker, but is observed by the employer on the job. Assume that an 
employer can fire a worker, but this act is costly and the firing costs are h in terms of the final good. 
Also assume that firms are sufficiently large so that the distribution of workers’ efficiencies within 
each firm is the same as the aggregate distribution. First note, that due to asymmetric information, both 
skilled and unskilled wages are equal for all workers, irrespective of efficiency. Consider next an 
employer who uses skilled labor to produce an intermediate good. Since the employer knows the 
efficiency of workers, he will fire those with efficiency e that satisfies: .)( hwiep ss −<−  
Hence, the threshold for firing skilled workers Es(i) is determined by: 
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The firing threshold in the unskilled sector is similar. It follows from (A.11) that to find the threshold 
for firing we need to find the equilibrium price of the intermediate good, which is produced by skilled 
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labor. Note that profits are driven to zero due to free entry and hence price equals average cost per unit 
produced, including firing costs: 
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Together with (A.11) we get: 
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 The results for unskilled goods are symmetric. Next, consider technology adoption. A producer shifts 
to industrial technology if the unit cost of producing by machines is lower than the average unit cost of 
producing by labor. Hence, the technological threshold is determined by: 
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The technological threshold in the unskilled sector is similar and in a similar way to the benchmark 
model we can derive the same “goods market equilibrium condition” as condition (9) in the 
benchmark model. In the Skilled sector we get: 
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The equilibrium condition in the market for unskilled labor is similar. Thus: 
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This labor market equilibrium condition constitutes a positive relationship between fn and fs. Hence, 
together with the “goods market equilibrium condition” it determines a unique general equilibrium, as 
can be described in a diagram similar to Figure 1. Using it we can show that a rise in firing costs h 
increases fn and lowers fs.  
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                                                               Figure 3 
Labor/Capital Ratio in “Continental” and “Anglo-Saxon” Countries 
(Index, 1972=1) 
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Source: Own calculations, based on data from the OECD Economic Outlook, December 2005. The computation is based 
on Blanchard (1997, p. 96), following the codes that he kindly provided, and the sample of countries is essentially the same 
as in that paper. However, some differences are worth mentioning: 1- Updated data set; 2- Australia is excluded, due to 
lack of data necessary to compute the GDP of the business sector; 3- We start in 1972, so that the sample of countries is 
exactly the same in every year (some countries have missing data before that year); 4- Cross-country averages weight 
countries in proportion to 2000 GDP in PPP units. Anglo Saxon countries are: US Canada and UK; Continental are 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. 
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Figure 4: Capital per Hour Worked, 2000, US and EU-4 
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b. High-Skill Sectors 
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Figure 5 
Ratio of Capital in Skilled Sectors to Output in US, France, Italy, and Germany 
 
Ks/Y
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
ye
ar
19
51
19
56
19
61
19
66
19
71
19
76
19
81
19
86
19
91
19
96
20
01
s_k_t_y_ita
s_k_t_y_fra
s_k_t_y_deu
s_k_t_y_usa
 
 
Source: OECD for France, Italy and Germany, BEA for the US. 
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Figure 6 
 
Ratios of Capital in Low Skilled Sectors to Output in US, France, Italy and Germany 
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Source: OECD for France, Italy and Germany and BEA for the US. 
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Figure 7 
 
Ratios of Capital to Value Added in Low Skilled Sectors in the US and Europe 
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Figure 8 
 
Ratios of Capital to Value Added in High Skilled Sectors in the US and Europe 
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Figure 9 
 
Ratios of Capital to Value Added in Low Intermediate Skilled Sectors in the US and Europe 
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Figure 10 
Personal Computers per capita 
(in logs) 
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       Source: HCCTA. 
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Figure 11 
 
Industrial Robots as share of GDP 
(in logs) 
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       Source: HCCTA. 
 
 
 
